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Disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: Communication Tactics and 
Grand Strategies 
 
 
Chin-Chung Chao1 and Dexin Tian2 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study explores the communication tactics and grand strategies of each of the 
involved parties in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. Under the theoretical 
balance between liberal optimists and realist pessimists and through the hermeneutic 
analysis of the primary data of relevant remarks of governmental officials, official 
statements, letters and memoranda, declassified CIA reports, interview transcripts of 
scholars and experts, relevant media reports and readers’ online responses from the 
LexisNexis news database and Google News website as well as secondary data of 
relevant study results of scholars and researchers, we found that the Japanese have 
been secretive and opportunistic, the Americans calculated and one-sided, the 
Taiwanese cooperative and compromising, and the Chinese assertive and ambitious. 
As grand strategies, Japan plans to become a normal state with a normal army for 
regional and global leadership. The US makes sure that it has no rivals in all aspects 
regardless of its close ally Japan or trade-partner China so as to maintain hegemonic 
supremacy in the world. Taiwan adopts a grand strategy of accommodation and 
compromise to raise the confidence level in its political identity and economic 
integration. China pursues its peaceful development by accelerating economic 
growth, building up defensive military forces, and creating a favorable international 
environment. The findings provide valuable understanding of the international 
nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island disputes and insight into a long list of similar 
territorial and bordering issues in the East and South China Seas.  
 
 
Keywords: Communication tactics, grand strategies, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
disputes    
 
For decades, there have been intensifying maritime territorial clashes in both 
the Each China Sea and South China Sea.  
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In the East China Sea, the disputes over the sovereignty of a group of islands 
between the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and Japan since the 1970s, 
which also involve the Republic of Taiwan (ROC or Taiwan) and the US, have 
become so frequent and intense that they are considered “one of the most burning 
matters in Sino-Japanese relations and even in East Asian politics at large” 
(HagstrÖm, 2005, p. 160). Taking the intensity of the situation into consideration, the 
US has recently passed a resolution, reaffirming its strong support “for the peaceful 
resolution of territorial sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific 
maritime domains” (Senate Resolution 167, 2013, p. 1). 
 
The disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands came to the open when the 
United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported, “a 
high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be 
one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world” (Emery, et al. 1969, pp. 39-41). 
Since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands sit right in the middle of the reported oil and gas 
deposits, periodic tensions and conflicts as well as nation-wide campaigns over the 
sovereignty of these islands have been witnessed among Japan, China, and Taiwan 
since the 1970s with growing intensity and increasing scales. All claimants stick to 
their claims with no inch of compromise for the strategic significance of the islands 
and national interests as well as national identity at the same time.  
 
To make the issue more complicated, the US took control and administered 
the islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands from 1953 till 1971 (Manyin, 2013). In 1971, 
the US returned the Ryukyu Islands including the administrative rights of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. For its own 
national interests, the US “has never taken a position on sovereignty, but we have 
made it very clear that the islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations, and the 
obligation to defend Japan” as stressed by former US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton (Remarks by Hillary Clinton, 2010, para. 22). The disputes over these islands 
and the reactions of the involved parties have already caused waves of sensation all 
over the world. Valencia (2007) warned, “disputes over small islands and ocean space 
may become the tail that wags the dog of international relations” (p. 128).  
 
Kristof (2010) also stressed, “this is a boundary dispute that could get ugly 
and some day have far-reaching consequences for China, Japan, Taiwan and the 
United States” (p. 1). 
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Thus, we can see that there are roughly two sides of four parties in the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. While China, Taiwan and Japan are claimants in the 
disputes, the US is siding with Japan as a deeply-involved party. Although there are 
different motives in each of the involved parties, China has been supporting Taiwan 
in its claim over the sovereignty of the islands under the jurisdiction of Yilan County 
whereas the US has been backing up Japan in its declaration of the islands as part of 
Okinawa of Japan. In the process of this decade-long disputes, China is looming large 
as a big rising power, the US is defending its world supremacy, and Japan and Taiwan 
have never been contented with their international images. To us communication 
scholars, the disputes under discussion are international and cross-cultural in nature 
and each party is fighting for its own national interests and reestablishing its expected 
national identity in the process. In this study, we aim to focus on the major conflicts 
in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes by exploring the communication tactics and 
grand strategies of each of the involved parties. Before specifying our research 
questions for the realization of our research purposes, we conduct the following 
literature review as our research foundation and academic guidance.  
 
Literature Review 
 
For the purposes of our study, we draw from and contribute to three 
categories of literature: (1) the geographical information of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Island and the claimants’ sovereignty claims; (2) the major conflicts in the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes; and (3) the nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
disputes.  
 
The geographical information and the claimants’ sovereignty claims. The 
islands under discussion used to be called the Pinnacle Islands in English. Today, they 
are better known as Diaoyu Islands in China, Diaoyutai in Taiwan, and Senkakus in 
Japan. As an archipelago, the islands are located in the East China Sea “about 100 
nautical miles northeast of Chi-lung, the major northern port of Taiwan,” and 
“approximately 220 nautical miles from Naha, Okinawa, and Fu-chou, China” 
(Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (CIA, 1971). 
 
 Altogether, the islands consist of five islets and three rocky outcroppings with 
a total landmass of less than 7 square kilometers or 3 square miles. Japan nationalized 
three of the islands on September 25, 2012.  
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The largest island is about two miles in length and less than one mile in width. 
None of the islands are inhabited or have had any human economic activities from 
indigenous resources. Appendix A provides an updated map of the disputed islands 
by Centanni (2013). Based on “Dioayu Dao: An Inherent Territory of China (White 
Paper of PRC)” (State Council Information Office of PRC, 2012) and the Official 
Statement of “The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the Territory of the 
Republic of China (Official Statement of ROC)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
ROC), we can summarize the sovereignty claims of China and Taiwan as follows:   
 
1) The Diaoyu/Diaoyutai Islands are an inseparable part of Yilan County of 
Taiwan. Since PRC considers Taiwan part of China; therefore, the islands are part of 
the Chinese territory; 2) The islands were discovered, named, and used by the Chinese 
for centuries; 3) The islands are the prolongation of the East China Sea continental 
shelf, with the black trench separating the territorial waters of Taiwan and Ryukyu or 
today’s Okinawa; 4) Japan’s occupation of the islands in 1895 during the first Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-1895 is illegal and invalid; and 5) The islands were returned to 
China in accordance with the international legal documents of the Cairo Declaration in 
1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation in 1945.  
 
In “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (The Basic 
View of Japan)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013b) and Q&A on the 
Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013a), Japan sticks to the 
following claims: 1) The Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japan as terra nullius 
by a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895 after repeated surveys, and Japan 
demonstrated continuous state authority on them henceforth; 2) The islands were not 
included in the territory of Taiwan, which had been ceded to Japan according to the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895; 3) The islands were not as part of the territory that Japan 
had to give up but as part of the territory under US management in accordance with 
Items No 2 and No. 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951; 4) The islands were 
returned to Japan with the Ryukyu Islands by the US in 1971, and China and Taiwan 
never raised any objections until potential oil reserves were identified in the region; 
and 5) Maps of China and textbooks in Taiwan used to recognize the islands as 
Japanese territory; therefore, there exists no disputes of the sovereignty over these 
islands.   
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The Major Conflicts in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. According 
to Burton (1990), disputes are confrontations that can be resolved by means of 
negotiation or arbitration whereas conflicts refer to long-term, deeply-rooted issues 
which are non-negotiable. In accordance with Burton’s definition of conflicts, there 
have been four major conflicts in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes based on The 
Basic View of Japan, White Paper of PRC, Official Statement of ROC and the study 
results of scholars (e.g.: Beukel, 2011; Drifte, 2013; Shaw, 1999; Swaine, 2013).  
 
The 1885-1895 conflict. Japan claimed that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were 
found terra nullius or uninhabited and incorporated into its territory by virtue of a 
Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895 after thorough surveys since 1885 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013b). Both China and Taiwan hold that the islands were 
first discovered, named, and used by the Chinese since the 14th century. Japan seized 
the opportunity of China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 to annex 
the islands with the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed on April 17, 1895, three months after 
its Cabinet Decision (State Council Information Office of PRC, 2012; Shaw, 1999).  
 
The 1951-1972 conflict. Japan insisted that, under the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
of 1951, it renounced Taiwan but maintained territorial sovereignty over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The US, which administrated the Ryukyu Islands from 1953 
to 1971, returned the Ryukyu Islands including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to Japan 
under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971. Neither China nor Taiwan made any 
objections to the above stipulations until potential oil reserves were identified in the 
region in 1971 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013b).  
 
To both China and Taiwan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were returned to 
China after World War II. However, it is the US that arbitrarily included the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under the US trusteeship in the 1950s and decided to return 
the administration power over them to Japan in the 1970s under the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty, which was signed without the presence and agreement of neither China nor 
Taiwan (State Council Information Office of PRC, 2012). The governments of both 
China and Taiwan filed solemn official protests, but they did not alter the US 
decision. Therefore, China and Taiwan consider the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971 
invalid and the authorization of Japanese administrative power over the islands illegal. 
In May 1972, “thousands of overseas Chinese students mainly from Taiwan and 
Hong Kong participated in protest marches in major U.S. cities” (Shaw, 1999, p. 14).  
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The 1989-1997 conflict. While China was under extreme pressure from the 
Western World due to its 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Japan was preparing to 
approve the lighthouse on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands erected in 1978 by the 
Japanese right-wing group, Nihon Seinensha or Japan Youth Federation, as an 
“official navigation indicator” (Shaw, 1999). By the same token, the same right-wing 
group set up a five-meter, solar powered, aluminum lighthouse on another island of 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands “as Chinese sensitivities had been heightened by the 
Taiwan Straight crisis of 1995-6” (Beukel, 2011, p. 12). In 1996, the Japanese Diet 
officially ratified the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the UN 
Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLS), which covered the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands. Since then, Japan began excluding foreign fishing in its EEZ by vessels and 
helicopters from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency.  
 
As responses, the governments of both China and Taiwan condemned the 
lighthouse erections as a violation of Chinese sovereignty, and a front-page editorial in 
the People’s Daily declared: “Whoever expects the 1.2 billion Chinese people to give up 
even an inch of their territory is only daydreaming” (Downs & Saunders, 1998/99, p. 
133). As a signatory of the UNCLS, China also clarified its 200-mile EEZ, which 
included the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, overlapping the declared EEZ of Japan. 
Besides, thousands of emotional “Baodiao” or defending the Diaoyu Islands 
demonstrators went to the streets of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.  
 
   The 2012-the present conflict. Provoked by the Japanese Central 
Government’s decision on a trawler collision with the ships of the Japanese coast 
guards in 2010 and taking advantage of the US pivot or rebalancing strategy in the 
Asia-Pacific region since 2011, then Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara announced 
that Tokyo Municipal Government would raise 2.05 billion yen or $26 million to 
purchase three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in order to assert Japanese sovereignty. 
With the intention to prevent a bigger crisis in the relation with China, the Japanese 
government under Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda spent the same amount 
purchasing the three islands and nationalized them.  
 
Seeing that there is no need to respect the status quo any longer, China 
publicly declared its territorial sea baselines around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. For 
the first time, China claimed that the islands are under Chinese administration. In late 
2012, there appeared large-scale, numerous, and sometimes violent demonstrations in 
the streets of China, Taiwan, and Japan.  
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Since then, there has been “an ongoing pattern of potentially dangerous 
interactions between Chinese and Japanese air and naval vessels jostling for position 
in or near the islands’ territorial air space and waters” (Swaine, 2013, p. 1).  
 
The nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. The 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes are complicated and multifaceted because of 
historical, economic and symbolic significance. The complexity of the disputes is, in 
the words of Pan (2007), 
 
not only in its multiple and interrelated foci such as its ownership, its return, 
and the demarcation of the Sino-Japanese maritime boundary, but also in its 
entanglement with other problems in bilateral relations, both China and Japan’s 
domestic politics, and their respective broad foreign relations as well. (p. 87) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes involve two sides 
of China and Taiwan as the accusers and Japan and the US as the defenders, and each 
of the four parties has its own motives and goals throughout the disputes. According 
to Blanchard (2000), the value of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands lies in “the rights they 
convey to energy and rich fishing grounds, the proximity they afford to strategic sea 
lanes, and the relevance they have to other territorial disputes” (p. 122). Below is an 
account of the three aspects of significance. 
 
Historical significance. According to Zhu (2011), the Diaoyuyu/Senkaku 
Islands disputes are just a trigger of conflicts between China and Japan. Actually, one 
of the main reasons behind the disputes is “the mistrust between Japan and China 
related to history” (p. 2). Since 1900, Japan secretly changed the name of the islands 
from Diaoyu to Senkaku, and China and Taiwan were left “unaware that the 
uninhabited ‘Senkaku Islands’ were in fact the former Diaoyu Islands” (Shaw, 2012, 
para. 15). For decades, Japan kept revising its history textbooks for school students by 
replacing “Shinlyaku” meaning “invade” with “Shinnshutsu” meaning “enter” in the 
accounts of Japanese occupation of China during World War II (1937-1945). There 
are historical documents and photographs from “Western businessmen and 
missionaries who remained in Nanking” (Yale Divinity School Library, 2008), 
showing that the Japanese soldiers killed about 300,000 Chinese including women and 
children during the Nanjing Massacre from December 1937 to January 1938. 
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 However, today’s Japanese tend to believe that either the number of the dead 
Chinese was exaggerated or the Massacre itself is a fake narrative (Shudo, Susumu & 
Shinjiro, 2005). It is true that Japan “formally apologized in 1993 to the women who 
were forced into wartime brothels for Japanese soldiers, and in 1995 to nations that 
suffered from Japanese aggression during the war,” as Fackler (2013, para. 2) 
reported. It is also true that ultranationalists in Japan and hawkish government 
officials like, Shinzo Abe, the current Prime Minister have kept “whitewashing Japan’s 
wartime atrocities” (Fackler, 2013, para. 2), “visiting the Yasukuni Shrine where 1068 
convicted war criminals together with 13 Class A war criminals were secretly 
enshrined” (War Criminals, 2003, para. 3), and “planning to rewrite Japan’s 66-year-
old pacifist constitution” (Hayashi, 2013, para. 2). Most seriously, the Japanese 
government today denies the existence of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes even 
though “both governments agreed to shelve the issue when the two countries 
normalized their diplomatic relations in 1972 and concluded their Peace and Friendship 
Treaty in 1978” (Drifte, 2013, p. 17). Thus, there is a “mutual denial of status 
recognition between China and Japan” (Yang, 2008, p. 273). Without taking sufficient 
cautions from both Japan and China, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes could 
become a second Marco Polo Bridge Event, a self-created excuse for a bigger plot.  
 
Economic significance. Economically, sovereignty over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands could “convey exclusive economic rights to nearly 20,000 
square nautical miles of undersea resources” (Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2008, pp. 903-904). 
It means that control of the islands would confer ownership of natural resources such 
as fishery and potential oil and gas reserves in their vicinity. The islands, which are 
located on the eastern edge of the continental margin in the East China Sea, exerts 
great impact on “both China and Japan’s increasingly voracious appetite for energy, 
natural resources, and extension into the high seas” (Pan, 2007, p. 72). Meanwhile, the 
sovereignty over the islands “can be a factor that significantly influences the location 
of a maritime boundary between China and Japan” (p. 84). With China’s continuous 
economic growth, especially surpassing Japan as the second-largest economy in 2010, 
Japan felt increasingly threatened as it does not “accept China’s claim of benignity or 
‘peaceful rise’, nor does it recognize the legitimacy of a putative Chinese hegemony in 
East Asia” (Goh, 2011, p. 8).  
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Symbolic significance. Since both China and Japan have maritime territorial 
disputes with their neighboring countries, both have been making the greatest efforts 
avoiding any potential negative domino effect in the handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands disputes. Just as Koo (2009) noted, any concessions in the disputes “could 
possibly jeopardize their respective claims to the other disputed islands” (p. 206). 
Furthermore, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes can also vent particular 
viewpoints of the rapidly growing nationalism and passionate thirst for national 
identity in all the claimants’ respective countries. This is why Suganuma (2000) 
remarked: “If there is a flash point to ignite a third Sino-Japanese War, it will be the 
disputes over the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea” (p. 151). In 
short, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes are not just territorial. They bear chain-
effect significance in the grand strategies in the national interests and strengthening or 
revising processes of national identities of the involved parties.   
 
Therefore, the hope of an immediate and effective solution to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes seems pessimistically dim and distant. As 
communication scholars, we intend to provide another perspective on the prospect of 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes by realizing the aims of this study as listed at the 
end of the introductory part. To this end, we raise the following two research 
questions (RQ): RQ1: What are the communication tactics in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands disputes? RQ2: What grand strategies do the involved parties intend to fulfill 
in the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes? 
 
In this study, communication tactics mean the carefully planned verbal and 
nonverbal behaviors in public interactions. Grand strategies refer to the purposeful 
employment of all available instruments of power, especially military forces for the 
long-term goals of a country. Answers to these questions will help understanding the 
international nature, the claimants’ claims, and the conflicts of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Island disputes. They will also provide insight into a long list of similar territorial and 
bordering issues concerning the three claimants as well as the US as a deeply-involved 
party in the said disputes and only superpower in the present-day world.  
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Theoretical Frameworks 
 
To comprehend territorial or bordering disputes and conflicts, there are two 
camps of scholars in general. While liberals argue that territorial disputes lose their 
salience as a result of increasing economic interdependence, realists counter-argue that 
economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace but also increases conflicts 
due to asymmetric dependence and inequality between economic partners. According 
to Cronin and Kaplan (2012), the arguments of both liberal optimists and realist 
pessimists provide the most helpful theoretical lenses for maritime territorial disputes. 
Liberal optimists believe in the pacifying power resulting from economic 
interdependence, international institutions, and democratization.  
 
First, it is the strong belief of liberal optimists that bilateral economic 
exchanges result in shared interests and good relations between states. In other words, 
“the greater the volume of the trade and investment flowing between two countries, 
the more groups of people on both sides will have a strong interest in avoiding 
conflicts and preserving peace” (Cronin & Kaplan, 2012, p. 12). Second, besides using 
trade as an instrument of peace, liberal optimists also attach great importance to the 
role of various international institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regional and 
international institutions can help “improving communication between states, 
reducing uncertainty about intentions, and increasing the capacity of governments to 
make credible, binding commitments to one another” on one hand. On the other, 
they can also help to “ease or counteract some of the pernicious effects of 
international anarchy by clearing the way for higher levels of cooperation and trust 
than would otherwise be attainable” (p. 13). Finally, liberal optimists find that 
democratic states rarely go to war with one another because “regimes that rely for 
their power and legitimacy on the consent of the governed are less likely to enter 
lightly into military adventures.” Therefore, “as the number of democracies in the 
world increases, the likelihood of international conflicts should diminish” (p. 15).  
 
In contrast, realist pessimists find “recurrent struggles for power and survival 
inescapable laws of nature and human history is a vicious circle” (Cronin & Kaplan, 
2012, pp. 16-17). They believe that “it is the material power and, in particular, the 
military strength of the various units in an international system that has typically been 
decisive in shaping the patterns of relations among them” (p. 17).  
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Vasquez (1997) summarized the shared fundamental assumptions of the 
realist pessimists about the world. Briefly, they assume that (1) nation-states are the 
most important actors in international relations; (2) international relation is a struggle 
for power and peace; (3) international anarchy brings about disorder and disputes.  
 
Due to the complicated and multifaceted nature of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands disputes, we looked through the theoretical lenses of both liberal optimists 
and realist pessimists for our study. Just as Jervis (1991/92) noted, “only rarely does a 
single factor determine the way politics will work out” (p. 40). Gaddis (1992/93) 
seconded, “significant outcomes are invariably shaped by the convergence or 
intersection of complementary processes or even the potential fratricide of 
contradictory ones” (p. 44).  
 
Research Methods 
 
For the purposes of this study, we collected our primary data from relevant 
speeches or remarks1 of governmental officials from Japan, the US, China, and 
Taiwan, official statements2, and historical records in the form of 
treaties/declarations/agreements, official letters and memoranda as well as 
declassified CIA reports3. We also included interview transcripts of scholars and 
experts4, relevant media reports and readers’ online responses from both the 
LexisNexis news database and Google News website5, and study results of scholars 
and researchers. The standards we adopted for the selection of our primary data are 
threefold: up-to-date, representative, and authoritative.  
 
For data analysis, we adopted hermeneutics to interpret the interactions in the 
above-mentioned communication artifacts of Japan, China, Taiwan and the US. Byrne 
(2001) explained, hermeneutics is usually used for the interpretation and 
understanding of texts derived from stories, interviews, participant observations, 
letters, speeches, or other relevant written documents and personal experiences. 
Girish (2008) further clarified, as an art of interpreting, hermeneutics developed into a 
theory of human understanding through the works of Scheleiermacher, Dilthey, 
Heideggar, Gadamar, and Derrida. The essence of hermeneutics is that “the 
concealed import of a text cannot be understood without uncovering the historical 
contact and the sociocultural milieu of the community on which it is based” (p. 2). 
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 This means that, to thoroughly and appropriately analyze a text, it is essential 
to understand the origin of the text along with its historical and cultural backgrounds. 
Thus, the selected texts in this study are closely examined in connection to their 
relevant historical and socio-cultural contexts for the generation of themes or patterns 
as research findings, which reflect the knowledge of the phenomenon under study. To 
reduce subjectivity during the whole process of our analysis, the two authors 
independently coded the selected artifacts, analyzed them comparatively at the 
message level, and kept exchanging notes, views, and conclusions of their analyzed 
results in accordance with the above theoretical and methodological guidelines.  
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
 Our research findings are twofold: the communication tactics of the four 
parties in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes and their respective grand strategies. 
Below is a detailed account and critical analysis of first the communication tactics and 
then the grand strategies of each involved party.  
 
Communication Tactics 
 
The secretive and opportunistic Japanese. The Japanese side has been 
secretive and opportunistic when they integrated the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands into 
their territory in 1895 and flared up most of the four major conflicts as described 
above. In its Q&A on the Senkaku Islands, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
(2013a) claimed, the Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japan as terra nullius with 
a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895 after thorough surveys, and Japan 
demonstrated continuous state authority on them henceforth. However, “official 
Chinese and Ryukyu documents confirmed that there existed no land without owner 
between the two neighboring countries [of China and the Ryukyu Kingdom]” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China b, para. 6). Even the so-called 
“thorough surveys” were incomplete as can be seen from the following declassified 
correspondence between the Japanese officials then: 
 
Your letter of inquiry, Secret No. 34, concerning the formation of the harbors 
and other related matters of Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima [Diaoyu/Senkaku] has 
been received. However, ever since the said islands were investigated by police 
agencies of Okinawa Prefecture back in 1885, there have been no subsequent field 
surveys conducted. As a result, it is difficult to provide any specific reports on them. 
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 (Shaw, 1999, p. 82) Although the Japanese government knew that “the 
aforementioned islands are close to the border of China… and China has already 
given names to the islands,” (Shaw, 1999, p. 75), it waited from 1885 to 1895 for the 
appropriate occasion and incorporated the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands into Japanese 
territory on January 14, 1895. The date of this decision is just three months before 
China was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War (Aug. 1, 1894-April 17, 1895). 
Moreover, the decision “was carried out in total secrecy and was never notified to 
concerned states, in particular, Qing China” (p. 99). Besides being secretive in the 
occupation the islands in the 1885-1895 conflict, Japan has been taking advantage of 
opportunities in other conflicts as well.  
 
For example, the 1951-1972 conflict occurred because the governments of 
Japan and the US excluded China and Taiwan and completed their backroom deals by 
exchanging administrative power over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for the long-term 
rights of military bases in Okinawa. On August 6, 1948, a declassified report from the 
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recorded that the Prime Minister of Japan sent 
a message to the US State Department in January 1951, agreeing to “give the US all 
required military rights there” for “transferring title to the Ryukyus and Bonins” (p. 
107). The US agreed and former US Secretary of State Dulles claimed that Japan had 
“residual sovereignty” in the Ryukyu Islands, which means: “The United States will 
not transfer its sovereign powers [administrative, legislative, and jurisdiction] over the 
Ryukyu Islands to any nation other than Japan” (p. 109). Commenting on such 
backroom deals, Price (2001) sharply noted, the San Francisco Peace Treaty “left in its 
wake not only a divided China, but also numerous other territorial disputes that the 
U.S. military is only too pleased to use in justifying its continuing presence in the 
region” (p. 6).  
 
Regarding the purchase and nationalization of three of the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands, the Japanese side is both opportunistic and misleading. To start with, ultra-
nationalist Shintaro Ishihara intended to “purchase the islands back in the 1970s” 
(Drifte, 2013, p. 36). As Governor of Tokyo then, Shintaro Ishihara felt very 
disappointed at the weakness in the Noda Administration towards China in dealing 
with the trawler collision case in 2010. When the US began implementing its re-
balance strategy in the Asia-Pacific region in 2011, Governor Ishihara regarded it as a 
golden opportunity.  
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He announced that he would collect donations and purchase three of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the name of Tokyo Metropolitan Government, with 
further plans to construct port facilities and other constructions. He chose his 
announcement “for maximum effect on the occasion of a speech at the conservative 
Washington DC-based Heritage Foundation on April 16, 2012” (Tatsumi, 2013, p. 
117). With the intention to “prevent an irreversible damage to Japan-China 
relations… and assuming that China would understand the reason,” (pp. 117-118) 
then Prime Minister Noda announced that the Japanese Central Government would 
purchase and nationalize the three islands. In the words of Tatsumi (2013), this “was 
the lesser evil of the two options” (p. 118). However, instead of lessening the tension 
between the two countries, the nationalization of the three islands by the Noda 
Administration added fuel to the fire and intensified the degree and scope of the 
conflict. From the subsequent consequences in the worsening Japan-China bilateral 
relationship, it is reasonable to suspect that the latter might be the genuine intention 
of the Japanese government.   
 
The calculated and one-sided Americans. As the architect of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes, the US first asked if China would take the Ryukyu 
Islands including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1943, then granted Japan the residual 
sovereignty over these islands in 1965, and kept backing up Japan in words and deeds 
ever since. When World War II was drawing to an end and when Chiang Kai-shek, 
former President and Generalissimo of ROC met US President Roosevelt in Cairo in 
November 1943, Roosevelt “enquired more than once whether China would want the 
Ryukyu Islands” (US Department of State, 1943, p. 324). Although Chiang agreed 
with a joint occupation with the US, the US completely changed its mind by granting 
Japan residual sovereignty over the islands. A declassified US State Department 
memorandum on the Ryukyus reads: “We recognize that Japan maintains residual 
sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, and have agreed to return them to full Japanese 
control as soon as Free World security interests permit” (Smith, 2013, pp. 29-30).  
 
The change in the US position resulted from two major reasons. On the one 
hand, the US sought to cultivate Japan instead of Chiang’s ROC as a key ally against 
the former Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. On August 
6, 1948, a report from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (1948) noted, “the 
failure of the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa since the end of the war indicates the 
impracticability of awarding the Ryukyus to the Nationalists” (p.3). The report also 
emphasized: 
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Recognition of China’s claims would involve a tremendous risk. Chinese 
control might easily deny use of the bases to the US, and, in the event of final 
subjugation of the Nationalist forces by the Communists, might give the Soviets easy 
access to the Islands. (p. 3) 
 
Thus, Japan was to replace Chiang’s China as a new ally of the US and, as a 
result, got rewarded with the expected ownership of the Ryukyus including the 
administrative power over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  
 
On the other hand, the US was reluctant to lose ROC to Communist PRC as 
a US ally and felt challenged by the potential domino effect of spreading 
Communism. Excluding China at the San Francisco Peace Treaty conference in 1951, 
the US was determined to make Japan “align it with the West and alienate it from 
Asia” and “the Pacific an America lake” (Price, 2001, p. 13). To ensure the success of 
its pivot strategy to the Asian-Pacific region today, the US continues supporting Japan 
in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes. On November 29, 2012, the US Senate 
approved Amendment No. 3275 to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, 
announcing: 
 
While the United States takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the 
Senkaku Islands, the United States acknowledges the administration of Japan over the 
Senkaku Islands…. The United States rearrirms its commitment to the Government 
of Japan under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 
(Congressional Record, Senate 2012, p. 7201)  
 
The amendment is meant to counter China’s attempts to challenge Japan’s 
administration of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Should China try to attack or take 
over the islands, the US will fight with Japan against China under its treaty 
commitment. Earlier, former Defense Secretary Panetta announced in Singapore on 
June 1, 1012 that by 2020 the US “will have 60 percent of its naval forces in the 
Pacific and 40 percent in the Atlantic” (Wan, 2012, para. 2). 
 
The cooperative and compromising Taiwanese. To demonstrate that the 
Taiwanese side has been cooperative and compromising in the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands disputes, we provide two examples.  
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After the ROC regime was forced to relocate itself in Taiwan, it became 
“politically, economically, and militarily dependent on the US” (Shaw, 1999, p. 114). 
To secure its national survival at the time and potential retake of the mainland in the 
near future with further US support, the ROC ambassador to the US clarified his 
government’s position in a memorandum on March 15, 1971 as follows:  
 
Since the conclusion of the second world war, the United States government 
assumed military occupation over the islands located south of 29 north latitude 
pursuant to Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; the Tiao-yu-t’ai Islets were also 
included within the boundaries of United States occupation, which the ROC 
government did not express its objection due to regional security concerns. However, 
this may not be interpreted as [my government’s] acquiescence to the Tiao-yu-t’ai 
Islets being a part of the Okinawa Islands. (As cited in Shaw, 1999, p. 113) 
 
Thus, cooperation and compromise are offered for “regional security 
concerns.” At the same time, these tactics are also applied when Taiwan emphasizes 
that the Tiao-yu-t’ai Islets or Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are separate from the Okinawa 
Islands. Below is another example of the present-day government in Taiwan. 
 
The government of Taiwan today is clear that its principal goal is to “obtain 
fair access for its fishermen to the waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, waters 
that have been traditional fishing grounds for Taiwanese fishermen for centuries” 
(Romberg, 2013, p. 6). This is why the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement was signed on 
April 10, 2013. The agreement “will protect the rights and interests of Taiwanese 
fishermen operating within a designated zone and extend their fishing area by an 
additional 1,400 square nautical miles” (Taibei Economic and Cultural Office in 
Vancouver, 2013, para. 1). Hailed as “a landmark agreement on protection of each 
jurisdiction’s fishing rights in their overlapping territories near the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands,” (Library of Congress, 2013, para. 1), the agreement best represents President 
Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative and East China Sea Peace Initiative 
Implementation Guidelines.  
 
The assertive and ambitious Chinese. During the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
disputes, China has been taking the assertive and ambitious approaches. That is, 
China “uses an action by another party as justification to push back hard and change 
the facts on the ground in its favor” (International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 12). \ 
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In response to the US position to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes and 
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, China has been both firmly assertive and 
strategically ambitious. In June 1971 when the US returned the Ryukyu Islands 
together with the disputed islands to Japan, the government of PRC published a 
statement, denouncing that “the treaty violated the United Nations Declaration on 
January 1, 1942, the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreements, the Potsdam 
Declaration and Agreement, and the Basic Post-Surrender Policy of the Far Eastern 
Commission” (Price, 2001, p. 3). In November 1971, when the Okinawa Reversion 
Agreement was ratified, the US Department of State emphasized that the US took a 
neutral position with regard to the competing Japanese and Chinese claims to the 
sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The change in the US position may be 
partially related to China’s firm reaction.  
 
 Aware of the Thucydides Trap which goes, “in 11 of 15 cases since 1500 
where a rising power emerged to challenge a ruling power, war occurred” (Abahachi, 
2012, para. 2), China did not object to the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. 
Although “many Chinese believe strongly that the United States is making every effort 
to prevent China from rising up in order to keep its own primacy in the world,” 
(Kato, 2012), still “China welcomes a constructive role by the United States in 
promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific” (Speech by Vice 
President Xi Jinping, 2012, p. 4). Furthermore, the Chinese leadership proposed the 
concept of a new type of great power relationship. President Xi remarked, “the two 
sides must work together to build a new model of major country relationship based 
on mutual respect and win-win cooperation for the benefit of the Chinese and 
American peoples, and people elsewhere in the world” (Remarks after Bilateral 
Meeting, 2013, para. 27). President Obama agreed by saying, “I am very much looking 
forward to this being a strong foundation for the kind of new model of cooperation 
that we can establish for years to come” (Remarks before Bilateral Meeting, 2013, 
para. 9).  
 
Nevertheless, in response to the 2012 Japanese purchase of three of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Chinese top leaders took turns and responded with 
“illegal and invalid” (Yamamoto, 2012, para. 1) from then President Hu Jintao, “never 
yielding an inch” (para. 11) from then Premier Wen Jiaobao, and “resolute opposition 
and strong protest” (para. 10) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. Besides 
the verbal counter-measures, a series of action blows were aimed at Japan.  
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On September 10, 2012, China announced territorial sea baselines around the 
islands and the names and coordinates of 17 base points. Two days later, China 
Meteorological Administration started providing weather forecasts for the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands area. On December 14, China submitted its proposals for 
the extended continental shelf to the UN Continental Shelf Commission. The 
issuance of the sea baselines “placed the disputed islands under Chinese 
administration and entrance by Japanese vessels would be considered intrusions into 
China’s territory and a violation of its sovereignty” (International Crisis Group, 2013, 
p. 11). On Nov. 23, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of PRC announced its 
aircraft rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, which covers 
the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Qiang, 2013, p. 1). Now, the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands are under routine patrol by Chinese surveillance airplanes and vessels, with the 
status quo changed from mere Japanese control to overlapping administration.  
 
Grand Strategies 
 
The grand strategy of Japan. The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes began 
when Japan implemented its imperial state policies of expansion since the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868. In the process of “self-removal from the Sino-centric system,” 
(Goh, 2011, p. 4) and modernizing their country by embracing Europe, the Japanese 
gained their “self-image of themselves as a ‘citizen-subject’ of an integrated nation” 
(Kim, 2012, p. 2). Their “sense of superiority to Asian neighbors grew to create 
Asianism that would justify invading neighboring countries,” which was gradually 
developed from the “Greater East Union Theory,” “Ideals of the East,” and “Treatise 
on Greater Asianism” (Shi, 2008, pp. 2-3). During the First and Second Sino-Japanese 
Wars, Asianism evolved into the “aggressive theory of East League and Greater Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere” (p. 4). Under such grand strategies, Japan integrated the 
Ryukyu Kingdom as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879, incorporated the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands in 1895, and colonized Taiwan from 1895 to 1945 and Korea from 1910 to 
1945. Japan also invaded China and many other Asian countries as well as the US 
from 1937 to 1945.  
 
At present, the Abe Administration of Japan has been steadfastly determined 
to “assume its rightful place as a major international power” (The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2013, p. 2) by stimulating Japan’s economy with 
“Abenomics” and expanding its army with the revision of Article 9 in its constitution. 
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The present-day version of the Japanese grand strategy results from the Abe 
Administration’s “larger effort to create something, akin to a ‘concert of democracies’ 
as a revival of the first Abe government’s interest in ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ or 
‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” (p. 3). The idea is to “ counter China’s growing 
influence by linking together states with similar values stretching from East Asia 
through the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe” (p. 3). In the Forward to 
the Defense of Japan 2013 (Annual White Paper), it is written in black and white:  
 
With the rapid expansion and intensification of activities by China in the 
waters and airspace around Japan…, the government has decided to increase the 
defense-related budget practically for the first time in 11 years to strengthen our 
defense posture. (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2013).  
 
It is clear that China is regarded as a source of threat to the national security 
of Japan. As its grant strategy today, Japan plans to become a normal state and join 
the UN Security Council for regional and global leadership on the one hand. On the 
other hand, Japan prepares to revise its pacifist constitution and reinforce the US-
Japan alliance for the expansion and strengthening of its defensive coast guards today 
and preemptive military forces tomorrow. Only when Japan genuinely reflects on the 
lessons of its defeat in the Second World War for peaceful co-existence and mutual 
prosperity with other nations, can it finalize its dream of normal statehood. 
 
The grand strategy of the US.  With a military expenditure nearly as much 
as that of the rest of world combined, the US has “labored for more than a century to 
gain regional hegemony. As a regional hegemony, the US makes sure that no other 
great power dominates either Asia or Europe the way it does” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 
238). Mearsheimer (2010) further clarified, it is “the US Manifest Destiny to expand 
America’s boundaries from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean” (p. 238). In the 
National Security Strategy of 2002, Former US President George W. Bush (2001) 
explicitly stated, “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries 
from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of 
the United States (para. 7). This is why, during the Cold War from 1945 to 1991, the 
US stepped into the breach between China and Japan and provided them with “dual 
reassurance, simultaneously guaranteeing China and Japan their security against each 
other and obviating the need for them to engage in direct security competition” 
(Christensen, 1999, p. 50).  
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With the shared Soviet threat disappearing at the end of the Cold War, 
cooperation between the US and China turned into competition and containment.  
 
To play balance for its long-term goals, the US authorized Japan the 
administration, legislation, and jurisdiction power over the Diaoyu/Senakaku Islands 
but sovereignty. Just as Blanchard (2000) put it, “what the US was giving to Japan 
with one hand, it was taking away with the other” (p. 120). The US has also repeatedly 
stated that “it remains an observer in the ongoing East China Sea dispute over 
sovereignty, but it has sided with Tokyo in claiming that the Senkaku Islands fall 
under the administrative control of Japan and under the US-Japan Security 
Agreement” (Arai, Goto & Wang, 2013, p. 6). In brief, the “Diaoyu/Senkaku problem 
arose both directly and indirectly as a consequence of the US Cold War policy in East 
Asia” (Koo, 2009, p. 228). For its grand strategy of hegemonic supremacy, especially 
its rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region, the US does not want to see a close China-
Japan relationship, which may affect its ring-holding tactic and long-term strategy. In 
the process of establishing and maintaining its hegemonic supremacy, the US has 
both gains and losses, exerting favorable and unfavorable impact in an immeasurable 
degree upon the rest of the world all the time. To guarantee long-term, mutual 
benefits for itself and the rest of the world, the US ought to outwit other nations 
without taking advantage of any of them by sowing or reaping conflicts.   
 
The grand strategy of Taiwan. During the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
disputes, the government of Taiwan has been trying hard to make its voice heard and 
national interests realized. First, it claims the disputed islands as “an inherent part of 
the territory of the Republic of China (ROC)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROCb, 
p. 1). Then, President Ma proposed his East China Sea Peace Initiative on August 5, 
2012 and East China Sea Peace Initiative Implementation Guidelines on September 7, 
2012. Still then, in terms of real actions, the government of Taiwan summoned Sumio 
Tarui, Japan’s representative to Taiwan on September 11, 2012 and met Tadashi Imai, 
president of Japan’s Interchange Association on September 25, 2012 respectively to 
“strongly protest Japan’s purchase of three islets of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands” 
(The Central News Agency, pp. 2-3). In addition, groups of Taiwanese, escorted by 
their coast guard vessels, managed to land on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands waiving 
flags or leaving marks or sailed into the disputed waters to declare sovereignty quite a 
number of times, such as September 1960, October 1996, and July 2012, to name a 
few. Finally, at the dismay of PRC, Taiwan went ahead and signed the Taiwan-Japan 
Fisheries Agreement on April 10, 2013.  
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Thus, Taiwan has adopted a grand strategy of accommodation and 
cooperation for its “confidence building and economic integration” (Zhang, 2011, p. 
269). Hopefully, Taiwan can continue playing its cautious and constructive role 
among the three overwhelmingly powerful partners and prove to be the best though 
as the weakest.  
 
The grand strategy of China. While including the sovereignty over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as part of its core interests, China has been realizing its 
military strategic goals of breaking through the first island chain, developing a blue sea 
navy, and “venturing into the global maritime domain, a sphere long dominated by 
the US Navy” (US Department of Defense, 2011, p. 1). As a grand strategy, China has 
been emphasizing the realization of the Chinese Dream of “economic prosperity, 
national renewal, and people’s well-being” (Remarks by President Obama and 
President Xi Jinping, June 8, 2013, p. 2). Connecting the Chinese Dream with the 
American Dream, President Xi of China hoped for “cooperation, development, peace 
and win-win” (p. 2).  
 
In practice, China has been implementing its grand strategy through internal 
and external balancing. Internally, China continues with the realization of its peaceful 
development by accelerating economic growth, building up defensive military forces, 
and creating a favorable international environment. Externally, China has been 
engaging in its charming diplomacy of a rising power by joining and creating 
multilateral institutions and increasing or enhancing complementary and cooperative 
international relationships. To avoid directly provoking unfavorable responses from 
the US, China’s grand strategy is meant to “maintain balance among competing 
priorities for sustaining momentum in national economic development” and 
“maintain favorable trends in the security environment within which such economic 
development can occur” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. 9). In the words 
of Lee Kuan Yew, former president of Singapore: 
 
The Chinese have concluded that their best strategy is to build a strong a 
prosperous future, and use their huge and increasingly kighly skilled and educated 
workers to out-sell and out-build all others…. The Chinese are not stupid. They will 
avoid the mistakes made by Germany and Japan.” (Allison, Blackwill, & Wyne, 2013, 
p. 5) 
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We can see that, as the second largest economy in the world now with a 
continuous economic growth, China is still cautious but gradually assertive on the 
international arena. To realize its long-term goal as a rising power, it has been revising 
Deng Xiaoping’s guideline of “keeping a low profile and achieving something” for its 
foreign policy in the 1990s to “upholding a low profile and actively achieving 
something” in the present-day world (Fravel, 2012, para. 2). There have been 
systematic misunderstandings and increasing concerns from not only Japan and the 
US but other relevant nations as well regarding China’s growing military power and 
vague future ambitions. Thus, clearer and better communication with the rest of the 
world should be integrated into its charming diplomatic policies and new big power 
relationship theory.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The purposes of this study were to explore the communication tactics and 
grand strategies of each of the involved parties in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
disputes. Under the theoretical guidance of the arguments between liberal optimists 
and realist pessimists and through the research method of hermeneutics, we have 
achieved two main research findings. As the answer to the first research question 
concerning the communication tactics of the four involved parties in the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands disputes, Japan has been secretive and opportunistic, the US 
calculated and one-sided, Taiwan cooperative and compromising, and the Chinese 
assertive and ambitious.  
 
As the answer to the second research question regarding the grand strategies 
of the four parties in the process of the disputes, Japan plans to become a normal 
state and join the UN Security Council for regional and global leadership on the one 
hand. On the other hand, Japan prepares to revise its pacifist constitution and 
reinforce the US-Japan alliance for the expansion and strengthening of its defensive 
coast guards today and preemptive military forces tomorrow. For the hegemonic 
supremacy in the world, especially its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, the US 
makes sure that it has no rivals in all aspects regardless of its close ally Japan or trade-
partner China. To raise the confidence level of its political identity and economic 
integration, Taiwan effectively adopted a grand strategy of accommodation and 
cooperation. Finally, it is the grand strategy of China to pursue its peaceful 
development by accelerating economic growth, building up defensive military forces, 
and creating a favorable international environment. 
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In our study, we have found the arguments of both liberal optimists and 
realist pessimists applicable and helpful. The grand strategies of Japan, the US and 
China, which are weighted more towards national interests and state power, are 
projected along the trajectory of the realist pessimists. However, the grand strategy of 
Taiwan and some part of it of China are inclined towards cooperation and 
interdependence as advocated by the liberal optimists. In fact, as the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands disputes are complicated, multifaceted, and dynamic in nature, all the involved 
parties have been shifting their verbal and nonverbal communication messages 
between constraint and aggressiveness in accordance with their respective priorities 
on other state, bilateral, or international affairs. 
 
Using the research method of hermeneutics, we successfully sought relevant 
speeches or remarks of governmental officials, official statements, and historical 
records. We also found interview transcripts of scholars and experts, media reports 
and readers’ online responses. For the generation of themes as research findings and 
insightful knowledge of the phenomenon under study, the research method greatly 
helped us conducting a careful analysis and thorough interpretation of the selected 
artifacts, by connecting the origin of the texts closely with their historical and cultural 
contexts.  
 
In conclusion, the issue of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands may continue to be 
negotiable and resolvable disputes, and it can also become non-negotiable and 
unresolvable conflicts or a frequent trigger of a potential war. It is a test of the 
wisdom and communication competence of the four involved parties not only in the 
communication tactics but also grand strategies. The Asia-Pacific region is considered 
a “key engine for the global economy” (VOA, 2013, p. 1), with half of the world’s 
population, 56% of the world economic output, and 70% percent of the earth’s 
surface. Hopefully, the interlocked relations among the world’s top economies will 
adjust their grand strategies and implement their communication tactics for the long-
term prosperity of their respective nations and genuine peace of the entire world.  
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Notes 
 
1. Speeches and remarks: Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping 
on June 8, 2013; Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping on 
June 7, 2013; Speech by Vice President Xi Jinpingon Feb. 15, 2012; Secretary 
of State Clinton’s Remarks: America’s Pacific Century in November 2011; 
Secretary of State Clinton’s Remarks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham 
Gia Khiem on Oct. 30, 2010; 
2. Official statements and news releases: US Senate Resolution 167 on June 10, 
2013; The Basic View of Japan in Feburay 2013; Q&A of Japan in 2013; 
Defense of Japan 2013 (Annual White Paper); White Paper of PRC on Sept. 
10, 2012; Official Statement of ROC; East China Sea Peace Initiative and East 
China Sea Peace Initiative Implementation Guidelines of ROC; Annual 
Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006; 
3. Historical records: CIA Report of The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Oil Under 
Troubled Waters in May 1971; CIA Report of The Ryukyu Islands and Their 
Significance on Aug. 6, 1948; Congressional Record—Senate on Nov. 29, 
2012; Okinawa Reversion Treaty on June 17, 1971; Foreign relations of the 
United States diplomatic papers, 1943; Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895; 
The Cairo Declaration on Dec. 1, 1943;  
4. Interview transcripts: Panel Interview by the Federal News Service on May 15, 
2013; Interview with Wang Jisi on Oct. 5, 2012;  
5. Media reports and readers’ online responses: See references 
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